FORTUITOUS ENDEAVOR Intelligence and Deception in Operation TORCH Commander John Patch,U.S.Navy (Retired) I n the European theater of World War II,1942 marked the nadir of Allied for- tunes.German forces in the Soviet Union had reached Stalingrad and threat- enedtheoilfieldsoftheCaucasus;AxisforcesinAfricaseemedonthevergeof pushingtheBritishoutofEgypt;andGermanU-boatwolfpackspreyedonAl- liedshippingwithrelativeimpunity.Latein1942,however,twosignificantAl- liedsuccessesservedtoturnthetideagainsttheAxispowers.AtElAlamein,a BritishoffensivedefeatedGeneralErwinRommel’sAfrikaKorps,whilealmost simultaneouslyahugeAnglo-AmericanforcelandedinNorthAfricatocontest Axiscontrol.ThesetwoactionsledtoafinalthrusttowardItalythroughSicilyin 1943, greatly facilitating the eventual Allied victory. ProfessorPatchisaretiredsurfacewarfareandnaval The North African and Mediterranean Allied cam- intelligence officer, and a career intelligence profes- paign,however,wasalsosignificantfordifferent,very sional.Heiscurrentlyanassociateprofessorofstrategic intelligenceattheU.S.ArmyWarCollegeinCarlisle secretreasonsthathaveonlycometolightinfullde- Barracks,Pennsylvania.HereceivedanMAininterna- tailinrecentdecades. tionalaffairsandpoliticalsciencefromVillanovaUni- ThisarticlewilldemonstratethattheAnglo-American versityandagraduatecertificateinstrategyandpolicy fromOldDominionUniversity,Norfolk,Virginia.He TORCHeffortwasahallmarkofeffectivecombinedoper- isa1999graduate(withdistinction)oftheNavalWar ational planning and execution—facilitated by military College’s College of Command and Staff and of the deceptioninformedbyprovenintelligence.Specifically, ArmedForcesStaffCollege.HehaswrittenfortheMa- rine Corps Gazette, Joint Force Quarterly, Armed examining TORCH through the new historical lens ForcesJournal,andU.S.NavalInstituteProceedings. provided by decrypts of German signals intelligence Theviewsexpressedhereinarethoseoftheauthorand (SIGINT) cements the contemporary principle that donotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheU.S.ArmyWar College,theU.S.Army,theDepartmentofDefense,or intelligence preparation of the environment,if done the U.S. government. artfully,notonlyprovidesenemyorderofbattleintel- NavalWarCollegeReview,Autumn2008, Vol. 61, No.4 ligencebutrevealsexploitableadversaryperceptions. 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THIS PAGE Same as 25 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 74 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW Inthiscase,SIGINTnotonlyassistedintheunmolestedAtlanticandMediterra- nean passage of immense convoys but effectively gauged Axis capabilities and intentions,as well as the reactions to Allied deception measures,prior to and duringtheoperation.Thus,theAllieseffectedthelargest-scalecombinedjoint undertakinginthehistoryofwarfareby1942virtuallyunopposed,duelargely toconsistent“readingoftheenemy’smail.”1 AbriefintroductionofAlliedsignalsintelligenceinWorldWarII,aTORCH overview,andadetailedlookatSIGINTsourceshelpplacetheoperationincon- text.Then,ananalysisofthethreat-assessmentprocessillustrateshowinsights intoGermanperceptionshelpedshapetheoperationalplan.Next,recentlyde- classifieddecryptsfillinhistoricalgapstoshowhowtheAlliesusedfocusedin- telligence efforts to conceal force movements for the operation and gauge the efficacyofthedeceptionstratagem.ThesedecryptsalsorevealtheAxisresponse as the landings occurred and help explain Allied countermoves. The role of “all-sourceintelligencefusion”inthestrategicdeceptioneffortisthenrelated. Finally,adiscussionofTORCHasamodelforintelligenceanddeceptioninoper- ationalplanningandexecutionofferslessonsforcontemporarymaritimeplan- ners,warfighters,andintelligenceleaders. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE Allied signals intelligence dramatically expanded during TORCH planning. Breakthroughs earlier in the war by British cryptanalysts at the Government Code and Cipher School (GCCS) at Bletchley Park led to the breaking of high-gradeGermanciphers,basedontheENIGMAmachine,andinturnanew source of intelligence information known asULTRA.Moreover,similarAmeri- cancryptanalyticeffortsledtoseveralsignificantadditionstothemanyBritish special-intelligencesources.TheNorthAfricanandMediterraneancampaignof 1942 under General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Armed Forces Headquarters (AFHQ)representsthefirstactual,operationaluseof ULTRAandotherspecial intelligenceintheplanningandexecutionoflarge-scalecampaignsandthefirst instanceofAlliedcollaborativestrategicdeception.Indeed,TORCHrepresentsa vehicleforthepracticalapplicationofsignalsintelligencetoanAlliedcampaign that became the model for future operations, such as HUSKY in Sicily and OVERLORDonthebeachesofNormandy. TheAlliesformedAFHQinAugust1942,afteraJulyAnglo-Americandeci- sionthattheinvasionofnorthwestAfricashouldbemadebeforeanyattemptto executeacross-channeloffensiveagainstGerman-occupiedFrance.Originally, PresidentFranklinD.RooseveltandGeneralGeorgeC.Marshall,chiefofstaffof the U.S. Army, were against any offensive not directly aimed at the German heartland, but London’s persistent and frank assessment of the limitations of PATCH 75 Alliedforcesactuallyavailablevis-à-visexpectedGermanoppositionconvinced themotherwise.2TheCombinedChiefsof Staff (CCS)thenagreeduponafall offensive,underthecodenameTORCH,tocapitalizeonGermanpreoccupation with the Russian theater, thus initiating the “second front” so desperately neededbytheSovietUnion. TheenvisionedTORCHplanwasambitious,consideringtheobviousdangers associatedwithAlliedtransatlanticandMediterraneanconvoysin1942.Forin- stance,theplaneventuallycalledforover1,400shipstosailfromAmericanand Britishportscarrying enoughmen andmaterieltosupportan extendedcam- paign in foreign territory and passing through U-boat-infested waters and Axis-controlledsea-lanes.HistorianF.H.Hinsleydeclaresthat“thescaleofthe Alliedundertakingwaswithoutpreviousparallelinthewar,indeedinthehis- tory of warfare:never before had states collaborated in dispatching such huge armadasoverthousandsofmilesofoceanandlandingsolargeanexpeditionin hostileorpotentiallyhostileterritory.”3 The scheme required that Allied forces establish a base on Africa’s Atlantic coastfromwhichtolaunchacampaignaimedatTunisiathroughAlgeria.Thefi- nalplanenvisionedthreeseparateamphibiousassaultsinthevicinityof Casa- blanca(inFrenchMorocco),anduponOranandAlgiersontheMediterranean coast. The plan called for three task forces: the Western Task Force from the American east coast and the Central and Eastern task forces from the United Kingdom. Finally, a concerted Allied push eastward along the North African coastfromAlgiers,alongwithincreasingpressurefromtheeastbyMontgom- ery’sEighthArmy,wasexpectedtoforceanengagementwithandthencrushthe remainingAxisforcesinTunisia.Berlin,however,couldpotentiallyarrayasub- stantialorderofbattleagainstTORCHforces. TheprimarythreattothetaskforceswasAxissea-andairpower,thoughthe potentialhostilereactionofFrenchmilitaryforcesintheAfricancoloniescould not be discounted. As for Axis strength, Italian forces in the Mediterranean, though not formidable in themselves, could doom the operation if used in a concertedefforttoattacktheconvoys.Theseforcesconsistedmainlyofasmall surface fleet with a few capital ships,several torpedo boats,a few submarines, andlimitedaircraftforpatrolandattack.TheGermans,ontheotherhand,had numerous long-range patrol and attack aircraft in Sardinia and Sicily (which mightoperateoutofFrenchMediterraneanbases),manyU-boatsoperatingin theAtlanticandMediterranean,andRommel’sarmoredformationsinTunisia. Additionally,GermanycouldorderthereluctantVichyFrenchforces,particu- larlythefleetinToulon,intoaction.TheseconsistedmostlyofFrenchwarships, small army garrisons, and shore batteries. Last, the threat of hostilities with heretofore neutral Spain existed, but Washington seems to have consistently 76 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW overemphasized it.Planners knew that ultimately the speed and stealth of the Allied operation would decide what additional Axis forces Berlin deployed in responsetotheinvasion. Various sources of SIGINT provided the intelligence that TORCH planners usedtoestimateenemyforcesandintentions.MostofthesesourceswereBrit- ish,buttherewereseveralAmericanonesaswell.First(listingthesourcesinrel- ative importance,from least to most valuable),the Signal Intelligence Service brokeVichyFrenchweatherciphersbroadcastfromNorthAfricaandFrancein July1942.4Thesedecryptsprovidedvaluableup-to-dateweatherassessmentsof theproposedinvasionsites,asthesuccessofamphibiousassaultswas(andstill is)extremelydependentonweather.Additionally,afterSeptember1942GCCS wasreadingtheGermanairforce(Luftwaffe)counterparttoVichyweathersig- nals, encoded in a system known to the British as CELERY, providing current weatherdatadifficultorimpossibletogatherotherwise.5Althoughweatherre- portingwasnotconsidered“specialintelligence,”itwasimportantnonetheless. Eisenhower,for example,frequently expressed his vexations with weather as D-day approached, in one instance declaring, “I fear nothing except bad weather and possibly large losses due to submarines”—the latter phrase a seemingunderstatement.6 Second,Vichyauthoritiescontinuedtousemanyofthesamenavalcodesthe French had used before German occupation, an apparent Axis oversight that producedaconsistentSIGINTsource.Vichyforcesdidattemptsomenovelen- coding,butthesophisticatedGCCSapparatushadnotroublewithit,sincethe basic ciphers had been in British hands since 1940,when several French war- shipssailedtotheUnitedKingdominsteadofcapitulatingtotheNazis.7Bythe timeTORCHplanningbegan,GCCSwasalsodecryptingsimilarVichyairforce signalsthatdescribedairassetsavailableinNorthAfrica. Third,severalItaliancodesalsoprovidedimportantspecialintelligencetoin- vasion planners. GCCS had in 1941 broken the C38M medium-grade cipher, whichwasusedandroutinelydecrypteduntilthewar’send.8Thisnavalcipher, used primarily for Mediterranean shipping, provided special intelligence on Italian navalforcesandintentions—thoughusuallyonlyafterthe Italianshad organized combined actions with the Germans. Further, the Italian air force high-grade“book”cipherwasbrokenpriorto TORCHandprovidedsimilarin- formationonaircraftdisposition;however,Italianaircraftplayedaminorrole beforeandduringTORCH,onlytocomeintoactioninreinforcingTunisiaafter thelandings.9 Anotherkeyspecial-intelligencesourceinvolvedAxisandVichyFrenchdip- lomaticdecrypts.Byfarthe mostconsistentlydecryptedandutilizedof these, theJapanesediplomaticPURPLEciphers,whichhadbeenbrokenbyAmerican PATCH 77 cryptanalysts in 1940, offered consistent insights into the German high com- mand’sintentionsanditsreactionstoAlliedmoves.Thesedecrypts,distributed as“MAGICSummaries,”providedreliableaccountsofAxisorderofbattle,and, further,vitalfeedbackastotheefficacyof Allieddeceptionmeasuresfromthe highest levels. Until November 1942 the Allies also read Vichy diplomatic ci- phers,deriving additional insight into French forces and government disposi- tionandconfirmingothersourcesof intelligenceonpossiblefuturereactions. ItalianandGermandiplomaticciphers,however,werenotbrokenconsistently enoughtocontributetoTORCHplanning,theformerbecomingunreadableaf- terthesummerof1942andthelatternotbeingdecryptedusefullybefore1943. GCCS consistently broke the German military intelligence ciphers of the AbwehrandSicherheitsdienst(SD),theintelligenceservicesof,respectively,the armedforcesandtheNaziParty(andtherebytheSS).Fromthemitgleanedeven moreinformationonintentionsagainst,andperceptionsof,Alliedoperations. AbwehrENIGMAciphersknownas“ISK”and“GGG”werebrokenafterFebru- ary1942,providingkeyglimpsesof theeffectivenessof variousdeceptionand coverplansforTORCH.10SDdecryptsrepresentedvitalcorroborationof other specialintelligence,particularlyonVichyFrenchandSpanishgovernmentreac- tionsaftertheinitiallandings.Moreover,SDdecryptsprovedparticularlyuseful in gauging the effectiveness of false information planted via double agents,as theycontaineddetailedreportssenttoBerlinfromNaziagentsinthefield. Thus,severalreliablespecial-intelligencesourcesgaveAlliedplannersvaluable informationoncriticalAxismovesandcountermoves.Anothervitalsourceofin- telligence,however,wasthatreferredtoas“Y.”Yintelligencewasbattlefield-level, raw information gained by listening posts and small units intercepting radio transmissionsinlow-andmedium-gradecodesandciphers,aswellasuncoded messages.Itwasusefulforidentifyingtheconstitutions,locations,andunitcall signs of enemy forces, as well as for confirming and complementing other, higher-grade signals intelligence. ULTRA and other special intelligence could sometimesmakesenseofotherwiseuselessYinformation.However,evenwhen successful cryptanalysis eluded GCCS, the presence of Y signals and wireless transmissions generally—particularly fitting known trends of format, signa- ture,orvolume—could(through“trafficanalysis”)indicateenemyactivityofa certainnature.PeterCalvocoressicommentsinhisTopSecretUltrathateffective “SIGINT—independentofanydeciphering—maybringanelementofintelligi- bilitytothebabbleoftheetherandtransformitintoapictureoftherealitieson theground.”11TORCHappearstobethefirsteffectiveAlliedfusionofULTRAand Yforoperationalplanningandexecution.12Fromsuchfusionflowsagreaterun- derstandingofhowcomponentelementsformasystemnetwork,revealingele- mentcriticalityandpotentialvulnerabilities(nodalanalysis). 78 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW Further,GermanarmyENIGMAciphers,knowntoGCCSasCHAFFINCHI,II, and III, provided another source of signals intelligence peculiar to the Afrika Korps.ThesecipherswerebrokenconsistentlyafterApril1942,producingmate- rialonlogistics,tactics,andstrategy.13Forinstance,CHAFFINCHcontributeddi- rectlytothesuccessoftheBritishoffensiveatElAlameinbydisclosingspecific tacticsandconfirmingRommel’sdesperatesupplysituation.Germanhighcom- mandsignalsalsogavecluesastointentionsandcapabilitiesfortheMediterra- neanandAfricantheaters. Other German ciphers, however, would prove much more useful in the planning andexecution of TORCH.German navy ENIGMAciphers,for exam- ple,werecriticalforgaugingshippingandnavalmovements,aswellasmari- timeshoreactivitiesduringthecriticalweeksjustbeforetheinvasion.GCCS decrypted PORPOISE ciphers after August 1942, generating information on trans-Mediterranean traffic before and during the operation.14 Additionally, DOLPHIN, read after August 1941, provided information on German home-waters shipping, occasionally imparting snippets of intelligence rele- vanttoTORCH.15Furthermore,thesedecryptsprovidedroutinesummariesof Italianadmiraltyintelligenceassessments—significantinthatItalyoperatedfar morewarships,transports,andmerchantshipsintheMediterraneanthandid Germany.ByevaluatingthesourcesandlocationsofGermanconcernsinsuch decrypts,theAllieswentfartowardaccurateassessmentsofAxisintentionsand capabilitiesintheMediterranean. Finally, by far the most reliable and accurate source of ULTRA comprised LuftwaffeENIGMAciphers.AsidefromU-boats,Luftwaffepatrolandattackair- craft posed the most dangerous threat to the invasion convoys and forces.Ac- cordingly, GCCS relied heavily upon Luftwaffe signals for indications of movementsandintentions.ItreadLOCUSTciphers,forinstance,afterJanuary 1942,deriving from them detailed information on the locations and employ- mentofLuftwaffeassetsinSicilyandSardinia.16Afactorthatmadethesesignals so valuable was that all Mediterranean reconnaissance and attack aircraft re- ported findings via Luftwaffe ENIGMA,making them a vital source of data for planningAlliedoperationsanddeceptions.Thistrafficprovidedthebulkofin- dicationsastoAxisdiscernmentof TORCH,suchasconvoysightingsandesti- matesofdestinations. GERMAN PERCEPTIONS RevelationsofkeyGermanperceptionsshapedtheoperationalplan.Beforefor- mulatinganyconcreteoperationalinvasionplanforNorthAfrica,AFHQhadto conductadetailedassessmentofAxisintentionsandcapabilitiesintheMediter- ranean theater. This assessment was largely a British one, as American PATCH 79 intelligenceagencieshadlittleinformationtoworkwithbeyondgeneralimpres- sions gleaned from MAGIC decrypts.Some divergence,in fact,still existed be- tween the two allies as to TORCH’s basic purpose.As the two nations’military relationshipdevelopedthroughtheCCSandAFHQ,however,sodidtheirabil- ity to learn from each other. A closer exchange of special intelligence at the higher-levelsinvasionplanningledontheAmericansidetoanappreciationof the more realistic British assessments. American leaders, however, remained concerned about the contingency of Spanish hostility,and the final draft plan consideredthispoint.IntelligencefromprovenSIGINTsourcesassuagedsome ofMarshall’sandEisenhower’sapprehensions. Earlyon,GCCSfocusedonLuftwaffeENIGMAdecrypts.TheAirIntelligence Section at GCCS had established a good baseline of Luftwaffe information by thesummerof1942fromlonger-termanalyticalstudies.Infact,thedirectorof thisbranchdescribedthepictureobtainedfromLuftwaffedecryptsasthemost completeULTRAsource:“Theintentionsof theGermanAirForcewerethein- tentions of the German Armed Forces as a whole.”17 He took this knowledge withhimtoEisenhower’sstaffatNorfolkHouseinLondon. Specifically, Luftwaffe decrypts provided telling evidence that up to D-day the enemy had little information on the TORCH plan,affording Armed Forces Headquarters the advantage of confidently shaping the operation around knownenemyunderstandings.ThegradualbutextensivebuildupoftheBritish baseatGibraltarinpreparationfortheoperation,forexample,couldnotlongbe hiddenfromtheAxispowers.Luftwaffedecryptsrevealed,however,thatBerlin wasmisinterpretingitasstagingforeitheraMaltaresupplyconvoyviatheCape of GoodHopeoralandinginTripolitaniaorTobrukinsupportof theBritish EighthArmy.18DecryptsalsoimmediatelyrevealedLuftwaffemovementsorre- inforcementsandtheirintentions—often,infact,statingtheirobjectives.With EuropeanandAfricanAxisforcedispositionknowntoTORCHplanners,Armed Forces Headquarters calculated that if operational security could be main- tained,theoperationcouldsucceed. An item of particular strategic value that special intelligence provided to TORCHplannerswasinformationonAxisanxietyoverthepossibilityofAllied invasion. For instance, German references in MAGIC to forces massing in the UnitedKingdomandtoanapparentlyimpendingAlliedoffensive—presumably asecondfronttoeasetheburdenontheSovietUnion—repeatedlymentioned specific locations of interest. In fact, disturbingly accurate MAGIC signals in early October projected Allied intentions to invade Africa to open the second front.19TheJapaneseambassadortoBerlin,GeneralOshimaHiroshi,exchanged suchinformationroutinelywithGermanmilitaryanddiplomaticleaders.Nev- ertheless,it appears that a myriad of other sources of information,combined 80 NAVALWARCOLLEGEREVIEW withtheself-perceivedsuperiorityof Germanintelligence,preventedanyAxis response—afactrevealed,again,byULTRA.Oshima’saccuratereportsonAxis intentions and disposition were often based directly on discussions with the highest levels of German leadership, even Hitler himself.20 Similarly, repeated referencesinhigh-gradeSIGINTthroughoutthesummerandautumnof1942 revealedAxisconcernaboutanAlliedthreattonorthwestEurope,Norway,and the Aegean.21 Finally, diplomatic signals between Madrid and the Spanish embassyinWashingtonbeforetheNorthAfricanlandingshowedthatalthough the“neutral”Spaniardsdiscernedtheprobabilityof theAllies’alightingsome- whereinNorthAfrica,theyknewnotwhenorwhere.22Certainly,suchinforma- tion on Axis European strategy was useful to both operational and deception schemers,permittingthemtoorchestrateanoperationintheassurancethatthe geographicalareawasreceivinglessthanmaximalAxisscrutiny. Theseintelligencesources,then,allowedAFHQtomoldanoffensivewiththe highestprobabilityofsuccess.ByOctober,TORCHplannersassessedthefollow- ing:thatGermanforcesweretieddownintheSovietUnionatStalingradandin theCaucasus,withnoprospectofvictoryintheforeseeablefuture;thatthewar intheAfricandesertwastaxingAxisresources—someofthemsenttothebot- tomof theMediterraneanbyULTRA-forewarnedaircraftandsubmarinesfrom Malta;thatgeneralizedAxisapprehension existedaboutan Alliedoffensive in EuropeortheMediterranean;andthatfewreinforcementswerebeingdiverted towardtheMediterraneanortosupportanymoveintoSpain.23 ArmedForcesHeadquartersdrewtheseconclusionsfromspecific,corrobo- ratedintelligenceonenemyintentions.Forinstance,byOctober,FieldMarshal AlbertKesselring,AxiscommanderintheMediterranean,predictedthatAllied forceswouldlikelylandsomewhereinNorthAfricabuthewasmuchdistracted by the stalwart British outpost of Malta; repeated bombing and invasion at- temptshadfailedtodislodgeitsentrenchedgarrison,andRoyalAirForcesorties fromMaltawereconsistentlyinterdictinghisseabornelogisticstrain.Further- more,Hitler’srelianceonhisownintuition(vicethemoreprudentcounselof hismarshals)indismissingItalianwarningsoftheimminentinvasioninNorth AfricadeniedKesselringassetsthatheurgentlyrequested.24AnxiousasAFHQ leaderswere,therefore,aboutthethreatstotheextensiveTORCHflotillas,there- alities of an enemy both materially preoccupied with a fluid front line some 1,500milesawayandfocusedlocallyonthestruggleinEgyptreassuredthem. OncetheAlliesreachedthemajorstrategydecisionsandAFHQstaffsolidified underEisenhower,theAmericansbegantocomemorefullyintothefoldofBrit- ishspecialintelligence,thoroughlyappreciatingastheydiditsdepthanditssig- nificancetoTORCH.Indeed,itwastheimminenceoftheinvasionthatbroughtthe introduction of American officers to Britain’s most highly guarded secret.25 By PATCH 81 SeptemberAmericananalystsservedatGCCS,participatingfullyincryptanalysis, signal watches,and research functions in a cooperative Allied effort.26 ByAugust,aTORCHintelligencepicturehadbeenproducedthatwastrulya combined Anglo-American effort. The first study, dated 7 August, dealt with three primary issues: the likely reaction of Vichy French forces, the threat of Spanish hostility and a possible German thrust through Spain,and the forms and extents of other potential Axis responses.27 The assessment, informed by specialintelligence,predictedthefollowing:Vichyforceswouldresistonlyuntil a resolute attack demonstrated Allied supremacy; Spain would resist German pressuretomoveagainstGibraltarunlessthatpressurewerebackedbyforce;It- alywouldnotsendforcestoTunisiatoreinforceRommelor,probably,riskits navybeyondtheaircoverofhomewaters;GermanU-boatscouldnotberapidly reinforced; and the speed of the Allied advance to Tunisia would dictate the magnitudeofAxisresponse. ByearlyAugust,realizingtheneedtofilterthedelugeof interceptedsignals downtoausablecoreofdata,AFHQG-2(intelligence)staffhadfocusedonAxis presenceintheMediterranean.WhiletheAlliedpictureofenemyintentionswas good, order-of-battle information was in short supply. Over time, Luftwaffe ENIGMA, Italian C38M, and Italian air force high-grade cipher decrypts pro- videdacoherentpictureofAxisforces.ThefactthatthedraftTORCHnavalop- erationalplan,dated3October,indicatedspecificlocations,numbers,andtypes ofAxisandVichyaircraftandnavalunitsdemonstratesthatintelligenceefforts hadachievedahighdegreeofsuccess.Theseforcesamountedtothefollowing: the small but capable Vichy fleet in Toulon and the meager naval forces in French North Africa; several hundred aged French fighters and bombers at North African airfields; the reticent Italian fleet, spread among Taranto, Messina,andNaples;roughlysixteenGermanU-boatsoperatingoutofGreece andItalyandafewE-boatsinthesameareas;170Luftwaffefighters,bombers, andreconnaissanceaircraftstationedinSicilyandSardinia;threehundredless capable Italian air force bombers and fighters located in Sicily, Sardinia, and Tripolitania;andRommel’sAfrikaKorps. TheOctoberstudyconcludedthattheonlyseriousoppositiontothelandings themselveswouldbeofferedbyVichyforces,asthedistantGermanforcesinthe centralMediterraneancoulddolittlewithoutreinforcements.TORCHplanners gauged the Axis aircraft in Sicilian and Sardinian bases to be the greatest air threattotheoperationandshapedtheoperationaroundthisfactor,buttheyes- timatedthatBerlinwouldsendnoreinforcementstotheLuftwaffeuntil“Dmi- nus 4”(that is,four days before the planned invasion date) and that seaborne reinforcementstoRommelcouldnotarriveuntiltwoweeksaftertheinvasion commenced.28Thereinforcementestimates,however,provedillusory,asArmed