The debate between impartialists and their critics has dominated both  moral and political philosophy for over a decade. Characteristically,  impartialists argue that any sensible form of impartialism can  accommodate the partial concerns we have for others. By contrast,  partialists deny that this is so. They see the division as one which  runs exceedingly deep and argue that, at the limit, impartialist  thinking requires that we marginalise those concerns and commitments  that make our lives meaningful. This book attempts to show both that  the dispute between impartialists and their critics runs very deep,  and that it can nonetheless be resolved. The resolution begins by  asking how impartialist political philosophy can defend the priority  of justice when it conflicts with people's commitments to their  conceptions of the good. It is argued that priority can only defended  if political impartialism has a moral foundation, and that moral  foundation must not be a foundation in the ideal of equality (as is  often thought), but a foundation in the partial concerns we have for  others. In short, impartialist moral philosophy must take our partial  concerns as central if it is to gain allegiance. However, if it does take our partial concerns as central, then it can generate a defence  of political impartialism which shows why justice must take priority,  but which also acknowledges that pluralism about the good is  permanent.

Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy PDF

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