This document discusses risk sharing in supply chains, specifically in the telecommunications industry. It analyzes coordination challenges like information sharing and capacity investment. The paper uses an agency model to compare known optimal mechanisms to actual industry practices of using price-quantity contracts. It aims to find theoretical and practical arguments for developing new coordination mechanisms.

International Journal of Production Economics Volume 90 Issue 1 2004 [Doi 10.1016%2Fs0925-5273%2802%2900471-1] Per J. Agrell; Robert Lindroth; Andreas Norrman -- Risk, Information and Incentives in Telecom Supply Chains

International Journal of Production Economics Volume 90 Issue 1 2004 [Doi 10.1016%2Fs0925-5273%2802%2900471-1] Per J. Agrell; Robert Lindroth; Andreas Norrman -- Risk, Information and Incentives in Telecom Supply Chains PDF

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