In this important book, Drew Khlentzos explains the antirealist argument                  from a realist perspective. He defends naturalistic realism against the antirealist                  challenge, and he considers the consequences of his defense for our understanding of                  realism and truth. Khlentzos argues that the naturalistic realist view that the                  world exists independently of the mind must take into consideration what he calls                  the representation problem: if the naturalistic realist view is true, how can mental                  representation of the world be explained?He examines this major antirealist                  challenge in detail and shows that many realists have dismissed it because they have                  not understood its nature. He sees it as a philosophical puzzle: the antirealist                  challenge, if sound, does not prove that there are no objects that exist                  independently of the mind, but that there is no rational basis for thinking that                  there are; we have good reason to believe in the naturalistic view, but (given the                  antirealist arguments) we have no way of knowing how it could be true. Khlentzos                  surveys the antirealist arguments of Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam, and Crispin                  Wright and suggests a realist answer. He argues for a radically nonepistemic                  conception of truth, and against pragmatist, intuitionist, verificationist, and                  pluralist alternatives. He examines and rejects some current versions of physicalism                  and functionalism, and offers an original version of the correspondence theory of                  truth.

Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge PDF

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