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SELinux Linux Security Module PDF

pages59 Pages
release year2017
file size24.54 MB
languageEnglish

Preview SELinux Linux Security Module

VSPMiner: Detec<ng Security Hazards in SEAndroid Vendor Customiza<ons via Large-Scale Supervised Machine Learning Xiangyu Liu, Yi Zhang, Yang Song Alibaba Security Whoami •  Xiangyu Liu •  Security Engineer @Alibaba •  CUHK PhD (2016) •  Academic: IEEE S&P, ACM CCS •  Industry: DEF CON •  Interests: Intrusion DetecMon, Mobile security •  Co-author: Yi Zhang, Yang Song @Alibaba Agenda •  Background •  VSPMiner •  EvaluaMon •  Summary Background-SEAndroid •  Android uses SELinux to enforce mandatory access control (MAC) over all processes. •  AYer Android 4.4 •  Privilege escalaMon becomes much more difficult Background-SEAndroid Framework SELinux Policy and Configura<on Files Security Server Context User Space Files Lookup Libselinux (support security policy ) … Policy Files read/write Mac Kernel Space permission SELinux Linux Record LSM Hooks Security Various Linux Configura<on Module (LSM) Kernel Services Files Background-SEAndroid Framework SELinux Policy and Configura<on Files Security Server Context User Space Files Lookup Libselinux (support security policy ) … Policy Files read/write Mac Kernel Space permission SELinux Linux Record LSM Hooks Security Various Linux Configura<on Module (LSM) Kernel Services Files Background-SEAndroid Policy •  The effecMveness of SEAndroid depends on the employed policies. •  allow/neverallow subject object:object_class permission •  sbj, obj, obj_class, perm (for short) •  Allow rules define benign operaMons •  E.g.,allow appdomain app_data_file:file {read write execute} •  Neverallow rules define privilege escalaMon (compile Mme) •  E.g.,neverallow untrusted_app init:file {read} •  Security labels <=> Concrete subjects/objects •  system_file <=> /system(/.*) •  system_data_file <=> /data(/.*) Vendors don’t know how to write policies @pof “Defeat SEAndroid” at Defcon 2013 Background-Refine Policy •  Using audit logs •  6-tuple access pamerns •  <concrete_sbj, sbj, concrete_obj, obj, obj_class, perm> •  Policy engineers parse the logs to refine policy •  Log access events not matched with allow rules Background-Challenges •  Millions of audit logs •  Expert experience •  Allow benign accesses •  Prevent malicious accesses •  Unknown new malicious access pamerns

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