The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric                  tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and                  economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous                  theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point                  of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are                  contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political                  institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary                  democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional                  dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce                  smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted                  government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the                  electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence                  corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's                  goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy                  outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the                  constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account.                  This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book.                  The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a                  methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.

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