In this highly original monograph, Nicholas Georgalis proposes that the                  concept of minimal content is fundamental both to the philosophy of mind and to the                  philosophy of language. He argues that to understand mind and language requires                  minimal content -- a narrow, first-person, non-phenomenal concept that represents                  the subject of an agent's intentional state as the agent conceives it. Orthodox                  third-person objective methodology must be supplemented with first-person subjective                  methodology. Georgalis demonstrates limitations of a strictly third-person                  methodology in the study of mind and language and argues that these deficiencies can                  be corrected only by the incorporation of a first-person methodology. Nevertheless,                  this expanded methodology makes possible an objective understanding of the                  subjective.Georgalis argues against the conflation of consciousness and subjectivity                  with phenomenal experience. Consequently, and contrary to common belief, he argues                  that consciousness without phenomenality is as strongly implicated in intentionality                  as it is in phenomenal states. He proposes a broader understanding of the "hard                  problem" of consciousness, arguing that there is an "explanatory gap problem" for                  both phenomenal and intentional states. His theory provides a framework that renders                  the vexing relations between mental and brain states comprehensible. Georgalis also                  argues for novel explanations of the phenomenal and of representation --                  explanations that follow from the core concept of minimal content. Treating the                  topics of meaning and reference, he introduces a first-person concept of intended                  reference derivative from minimal content that resolves various problems in the                  philosophy of language.Eschewing ontology, Georgalis proposes his theory as a means                  to make sense of, analyze, and relate issues in the philosophies of mind and                  language. The concept of minimal content, he argues, plays a necessary, pivotal,                  unifying, and foundational role in advancing our understanding of these                  issues.

The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language PDF

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