The War in Afghanistan (1979-1989) has been called "the Soviet   Union's Vietnam War," a conflict that pitted Soviet regulars against a   relentless, elusive, and ultimately unbeatable Afghan guerrilla force (the   mujahideen). The hit-and-run bloodletting across the war's decade tallied more   than 25,000 dead Soviet soldiers plus a great many more casualties and further   demoralized a USSR on the verge of disintegration.    In The Soviet-Afghan War the Russian general staff takes a close critical   look at the Soviet military's disappointing performance in that war in an effort   to better understand what happened and why and what lessons should be taken from   it. Lester Grau and Michael Gress's expert English translation of the general   staff's study offers the very first publication in any language of this   important and illuminating work.    Surprisingly, this was a study the general staff never intended to write,   initially viewing the war in Afghanistan as a dismal aberration in Russian   military history. The history of the 1990s has, of course, completely demolished   that belief, as evidenced by the Russian Army's subsequent engagements with   guerrilla forces in Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and   elsewhere. As a result, Russian officers decided to take a much closer look at   the Red Army's experiences in the Afghan War.    Their study presents the Russian view of how the war started, how it progressed,   and how it ended; shows how a modern mechanized army organized and conducted a   counter-guerrilla war; chronicles the major battles and operations; and provides   valuable insights into Soviet tactics, strategy, doctrine, and organization   across a wide array of military branches. The editors' incisive preface and   commentary help contextualize the Russian view and alert the reader to blind   spots in the general staff's thinking about the war.    This one-of-a-kind document provides a powerful case study on how yet another   modern mechanized army imprudently relied upon the false promise of technology   to defeat a determined guerrilla foe. The Red Army had fought their war to a   military draw but that was not enough to stave off political defeat at home.    This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.

The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost PDF

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