The UnfinishedQuatfor Unity THE UMFIMISHED QUEST FORUMITY Africa and the OAU Zdenel< Cervenl<a Jr FRIEDMANN Julian Friedmann PublishersLtd 4 Perrins Lane, London NW3 1QY in association with The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden. THE UNFINISHED QUEST FOR UNITYfirstpublishedin 1977 Text©ZdenekCervenka1977 TypesetbyT & R Filmsetters Ltd PrintedinGreat Britainby ISBNO904014 28 2 Conditionsofsale This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out orotherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form or binding or cover other than that in whichitis published and withoutasimilarcondition inc1udingthis condition beingimposed on thesubsequentpurchaser. CONTENTS Preface vii Introduction by Raph Uwechue ix Author's Note xiv Map xx CHAPTER l:The Establishmentofthe Organizationof African Unity 1 1. Africabeforethe OAU 1 2. The Addis AbabaSummitConference 4 CHAPTER II: TheOAUCharter 12 1. The purposes .12 2. The principles .13 3. Membership .16 CHAPTERIII:ThePrincipalOrgansofthe OAU. . .. 20 1. The AssemblyofHeadsofStateand Government .20 2. TheCouncil ofMinisters .24 3. TheGeneral Secretariat .27 4. The SpecializedCommissions .36 5. TheDefenceCommission .38 CHAPTERlY: TheOAU Liberation Committee. .45 1. Relationswith theliberationmovements .46 2. Organizationand structure .50 3. Membership . . . . . .52 4. Reformlimitingits powers .55 5. The Accra Declaration on the newliberationstrategy .58 6. Financial difficulties . . . . .59 7. ConfrontationinsouthernAfrica .61 CHAPTERY:Howthe OAU SettlesDisputeAmongst itsMembers .64 1. The African framework . . . . .. .65 2. Employmemofsupreme authority .67 3. Guidingprinciplesapplied invarious types ofconflict .68 CHAPTERYl:TheCongoCrisis(1964-1965) . .84 1. OAU interventionin the CongoCrisis .86 2. The 'Stanleyville drop' .89 3. Lessonsfram the Congo Crisis .94 4. New'Katanga' conflict .95 CHAPTERVII: The NigerianCivilWar(1967-1970) .97 1. The motivesfor GAVintervention .97 2. SummitatKinshasa .... .98 3. The KampalaPeaceTalks .99 4. Newinitiative - talksat Niamey 101 5. The Addis Ababa peace negotiations 102 6. SummitatAlgiers 103 7. The Monrovia Mission on Nigeria 105 8. SummitatAddisAbaba 105 9. End ofpeaceeffortsand the collapse ofBiafra 106 10. Conc1usions . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 CHAPTERVIII: GAV Policyand Strategy on SouthernAfrica. 110 1. South Africa 110 2. Rhodesia 122 3. The politics ofdetente 127 4. Portugal 134 5. Namibia 148 CHAPTER IX: TheGAVandAfro-Arab Relations 156 1. The GAV Peace Initiative onthe Middle EastCrisis in 1971 158 2. Afro-Arab unityatthe 1973 GAV Summit 162 3. Thecrumblingofthe Afro-Arab alliance 166 4. Afra-Arab allianceat the 1975 KampalaSummit 169 5. Afra-Arab ca-operation in 1976 170 6. The 1977 Afra-Arab Summit atCaira 172 7. Whatfuture for Afra-Arab ca-operation? 174 CHAPTER X: TheGAVand EconomicCo-operation inAfrica 176 1. The GAVand the EconomicCommission for Africa . 177 2. The GAVand the 'newinternationaleconomic order' 182 3. The newGAV initiative oneconomic problems 186 4. GAVsupportfor ECGWAS 188 5. The undoing ofillusions 189 Notes .... 191 Appendix 1: TheMembersoftheGAV in 1977 226 Appendix 2: TheGAVCharter 228 Index . . . . 236 PREFACE The purpose of this book is to help fill one of the widest gaps in understanding African affairs: although the Organization of African Unity is one of the largestinternationalorganizationsin the world, less is known about it than almost any other. Writingbookson Africahasalways been ahazardousenterprise. This is not only because of the rapid changes on the continent, which can outdate a manuscript overnight; more intimidating is the growing mistrust in Africa of books written by non-Africans. Given thatAfrica hasfor decades beenthe objectofEuropean and American research and experiments, based often on false premises and foregone conclusions, this hostility is understandable. The findings of the various research projects, which have been lavish and arrogant in dispensing advice to Africa on how to cure its il1s, have seriously weakened confidence in the value and integrity of such investigations - particularly when the governments and trans-nationalfoundations financing the research have often been largely responsible for those ills in the first place. On the other hand, some outsiders have gone out of their way to push 'the African point of view', ending up more pro-African than the Africans themselves - which pleasesneitherside. What is needed is a new approach. The author firmly believes that the future of Africa lies in co-operation with Europe and the outside world; indeed that such co-operation is goingto bevitalfor both sides. The efforts to create a new relationship in the economic field are known as the search for a 'New International Economic Order';butits equivalent in the political, social and cuituraI spheres has yet to be defined. Much of the present conflict between Africaand the outside world arisesfrom thelackofinternationalunderstandingofthe African scene. There has been great reluctance to facethefacts for fear they mightbe different from the assumptions upon which policies have been based. Thishas been particularly true of the OAV, which to this day has not been credited as itdeservesforits importantrole inshapingthedestiny ofthe continent. This book refleets the experiences and opinions of a wide circ1e of people, both African and European. I am greatly indebted to my friends at Africa magazine, in particularRaph Uwechue, Peter Enahoro and Godwin Matatu, who have given me an invaluable insight into African thoughtoninternationalrelationsand African affairs ingeneral. I am also grateful to eolin Legumfor his co-operation in writingjointly the annual survey of OAU activities for his Africa Contemporary vii Record, and for hisguidanceinunderstandingWestern policiestowards Africa. I would also like to thank Diether Habicht-Benthin and his colleagues at 3 Welt Magazm in Bonn, for their assistance and material towards the chapter on Afro-Arabco-operation;PeterOnu, forhishelp in supplying me with OAU documents and reading parts of my manuscript; GeorgeMagombe and Mohamed Sidky, for theirhelp with the chapteron the OAU LiberationCommittee;the Swedish diplomatic corps in Africaand at the SwedishForeignMinistry, for theirhelp both in Sweden and duringmy visitsin Africa;StanleyMoody, whohelped me edit the manuscript and encouraged me when it needed sweeping revision; and Christopher Hurst, Liz Clemens and myeditor, for their editorialsuggestions. Finally, Iowe agreatdeal to the DagHammarskjöld Libraryfor help with UN documents, and to the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies for the great support I have enjoyed throughout the long processofproducingthis book. Uppsala, 1977 ZdenekCervenka viii INTRODUCTION The OAV - Time for achange The Organization ofAfrican Unity wasfounded at atime when African leaders were experiencing their first taste of independence and were anxious to consolidate their leadership. Across the continent they saw the danger posed by the divisions of language, culture and religion, by the economic inequalities, by the controversies over boundaries arbitrarily drawn by the colonialpowers. Itquickly became clearthata high degree of co-operation was necessary among the fledging African States, if the continentwas tosurviveas aviableeconomicand political entity. It wasto achieve this co-operationthat the OAUwasestablished. Understandably, therewereconsiderabledifferencesofopinionas to how African unity could best be attained. The signing of the Charter establishing the OAU was quite an achievement at a time when Africa was sharply split into three rival blocs - the Casablanca group, the Monrovia group and the Brazzaville Twelve. Indeed, it is not sufficiently realized that, because of these deep divisions the OAU represents a largely negative agreement - not to move too much to the left nor too far to the right. Asaresultofthisstagnatingconsensus, the OAU has in the past fourteen years moved hardly at all. Kwame Nkrumah'scallfor continentalunity wasbrushed aside, and the African leaders settled for a superficial unity which brought together African Heads of States but not African peoples. This in no way affected the sovereignty of each independent State, and they were left free to pursue policies in which continentalpriorities weresacrificedto narrow nationalinterests. This arrangement suited the so-called 'moderate' conservative governments in countries such as Ethiopa (as it was then under Emperor Haile Selassie), Nigeria under Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, Liberia under President Tubman, and Libya underKing Idris;they had commanded amajority in the Organization, and made surethatnone of the OAU decisions would conflict with their interests. The willingness, on the other hand, of the 'radicals' - such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ben Bella of Algeria, Modibo Keita of Mali, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Milton Obote of Uganda - to join the OAU was based ona hope thatthey wouldgradually would be able to convince the others to come their way and shift the ix