In the days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, with almost 3,000 people dead and J.11 smoldering holes in LowerManhattan, western Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon, it must have come as an unpleasant surprise to the national leadership that the U.S. military had never really created any contingency plans for operations on the ground in Afghanistan. In addition, the remote location and lack of U.S. allies in the region made a conventional military response impossible, something that Osama bin Laden likely considered when he settled there in the 1990s. Transportation and logistics limitations alone eliminated any immediate conventional military operations with ground forces. Therefore, when the idea of melding special operations forces (SOFs), CIA field operations teams, and Northern Alliance insurgents as a response was put forward, it was not exactly greeted with unbridled enthusiasm. However, with no other options available, the use of SOF units as Americas first response to September 11 was probably seen not only as a last resort, but even the only resort, and approved. Today, however, things are very different.

The Year in Special Operations 2007 Editions PDF

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